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A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 514





After the year 2052, the duration of all copyrights will be set forth by
the Copyright Act of 1976,1 and the Copyright Act of 19092 will fade into
history. Until then, however, we must deal with the differing copyright
durations of both Acts and the differences in the way renewal terms are
handled. Under the 1909 Act, an author received an original copyright
term and a separate renewal term.3 To secure the renewal term, the author
or his/her successors had to reregister the copyright with the Copyright
Office.4 In contrast, the 1976 Act provides for a single copyright term with
no need to renew, and it extends the copyright term for works created under
the 1909 Act.5 However, the 1976 Act does not address the fate of works
copyrighted under the 1909 Act which lost their copyrights due to the
copyright holders' failure to meet various notice and registration
+ This Article won first place in the 1995 Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition
at the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
* Law Clerk to the Honorable William J. Holloway, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. J.D. 1995, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Thanks to Professors Robert
Berring, Stephen Barnett, and Andrea Peterson of Boalt Hall, and Eugene Volokh of the
University of California, Los Angeles for various insights. It goes without saying that any
mistakes or omissions are entirely my fault, and that the views expressed herein are not
necessarily those of the people mentioned above. The author can be reached at
TungYin@aol.com.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1992).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 10(1976).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
4. See infra Part ll.B.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994).
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requirements or their failure to renew the copyright for the 
renewal term.6
Those works fell into the public domain and anyone could use them
without the need to secure the permission of the author.7  Prominent
examples of such works are J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogys and
director Frank Capra's film It's a Wonderful Life.
9
In 1994, Congress addressed this issue.' 0 As part of comprehensive
legislation to implement the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),I 1 Congress enacted section 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994. The section restored the copyrights of
foreign, but not American, works that fell into the public domain due to
failure to meet the formalities required by the 1909 and 1976 Acts.
12
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the history and rationale of
United States copyright law. This section also sets forth the copyright
durations under the various Copyright Acts from 1791 to 1976, along with
the 1976 Act provisions for extending the copyright life of pre-1976
works. Part II also states the provisions of section 514.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of section 514. The
Constitution's grant of power to Congress to establish copyrights contains
an inherent limitation on the duration of copyrights. 13  The question of
whether reviving fallen copyrights constitutes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment is also discussed.14 Finally, Part IV considers whether section
514 sufficiently balances the equities between the copyright owners and
the public.
6. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
7. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975 (1990). The existence of
the public domain is, of course, the flip side of the fact that copyrights exist for a limited time.
Litman suggests that the public domain should be viewed not as the collection of unprotected
works, but rather as a method of protecting the "raw material" that makes authorship possible.
Id. at 967-68. Litman also demonstrates the utility of the public domain in solving "fuzzy and
overlapping property rights," id. at 1012, and in easing the burden on copyright plaintiffs in
proving the originality of works, id. at 1018.
8. Id. at 976 n.68.
9. See 138 CONG. REC. H4134 (daily ed. June 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. William
Hughes).
10. Congress earlier lessened the consequences of failure to comply with formalities and
later discarded the requirement. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
11. The Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), completed
on December 15, 1993, has considerably advanced international intellectual property protection.
12. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8 states that "Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
14. U.S. CONST. art. V states "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
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II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Congress passed Copyright Acts in 1790, 1909, and 1976, along with
a number of amendments to those Acts in other years. Congress' authority
to confer copyrights stems from the Constitution, which authorizes the
legislature "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. ... 15
A. Rationale for Copyright Protection
Although physically intangible, a copyright is regarded as a property
right.16 The owner of a copyright can control reproduction of and, to some
degree, the exhibition of the protected work. In effect, the copyright
holder has a limited monopoly on the copyrighted work. 18
The primary justification for granting a limited monopoly is an
economic one.19 Creating works of fiction, music, and art does not occur
in a financial vacuum, but imposes concrete costs on the creator. For
example, some costs include "time and effort plus the cost to the publisher
of soliciting and editing the manuscript and setting it in type."
20
Economists refer to such costs as "fixed," meaning that they do not vary
with regard to the number of goods created.2' Other costs vary with the
number of copies of the creative work being produced, such as "printing,
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Litman, supra note 7, at 971 & nn.27-36.
17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (5) (1994).
18. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (discussing
"[tihe monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (discussing "[t]he limited scope of the copyright holder's
statutory monopoly"); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 503, 506 (1945) ("We should start by reminding ourselves that copyright is a
monopoly.").
19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that copyright law "is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant..
. copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare."); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1,
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing the incentive
to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will rebound to the public benefit by resulting in the
proliferation of knowledge."); THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin
Wright ed., 1961) ("The public good fully coincides in both [copyright and patent] cases with
the claims of individuals.").
20. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STuD. 325, 327 (1989).
21. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7, 35 (2d ed. 1984).
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binding, and distributing individual copies. 22  Such costs are termed
"variable" or "marginal." 3
A rational actor will not produce a creative work unless he can at
least recoup his fixed and marginal costs. To do so, he will have to charge
a price for the work that exceeds the marginal cost of production so that
fixed costs are taken into account.2 4  Absent copyright protection,
however, a second person could duplicate the creative work and sell it at
the marginal cost of production. The price of the duplicate, therefore, will
be less than the original because the second person will not have incurred
the fixed cost of creating the work.
25
Thus, a major reason that copyright protection exists is to ensure that
authors will continue to create works without fear that their ability to
exploit the value of the work will be destroyed by imitators who have
lower average costs. One factor to be considered in judging the
constitutionality of any copyright legislation is, therefore, the balance
between the incentive for authors to create works and the resulting harm
from the limited monopoly granted to the authors.
26
B. Duration of Copyright
The first Copyright Act, passed by Congress in 1790, granted a
fourteen-year copyright term to authors. 7  The author could renew his
copyright for a second fourteen-year term, assuming that he lived past the
first copyright term.28 In 1831, Congress amended the Act so that the first
term of copyright protection lasted twenty-eight years, with a subsequent
fourteen-year renewal period.
29
22. Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 327.
23. VARIAN, supra note 21, at 35.
24. For example, suppose that the author spends $10,000 writing a novel and that the
marginal cost of publishing the novel is $1 per book. If the author expects to sell 10,000 copies,
he will have to charge at least $2 per book. Of that $2, $1 covers the cost of publishing, and the
other $1 represents the fraction of the fixed cost to be spread among all the books.
25. Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 328. But see Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that copyright law is unnecessary because the "lag time" involved
in copying a work provides the creator with sufficient time to recoup his or her efforts). Several
scholars have responded to Justice Breyer's article. See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at
330-33; and Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971).
26. Indeed, this delicate balance results from the tension between the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment.




The 1909 Act updated copyright law to meet the needs of the early
twentieth century. The Act extended the renewal period to twenty-eight
years, enabling authors to protect their works for a maximum of fifty-six
years.30  To secure the renewal extension, the copyright holder had to
apply to the Copyright Office and register the renewal within one year of
the expiration of the first term of the copyright. 31 If the holder failed to do
so, the copyright expired after the initial term, throwing the work into the
public domain.
32
By the 1960s, however, Congress concluded that copyright law
required further changes. The primary goal, pressed by authors and other
creators, was to increase the duration of copyright to a term of the author's
life plus fifty years. 33  As life expectancies increased, authors began
outliving their copyrights, which meant their later works had to compete
with earlier works in the public domain.34 As communications technology
improved, the commercial life of works were proportionally lengthened,
leading to a perceived need for longer terms of copyright protection.3 5 A
second problem that needed to be addressed was the inconsistency between
the 1909 Act and foreign copyright laws. Because the 1909 Act's term
was shorter than the copyright terms of other countries, 36 many American
works were receiving longer copyright protection in foreign countries than
they were receiving in the United States. This dichotomy fueled tensions
between the United States and other countries, leading to threats of
retaliatory action against the United States.
37
Another major problem that needed attention was the 1909 Act's
notice requirement, which carried harsh consequences if the copyright
holder did not fully comply with it. Some errors were fatal to the
copyright: omission of the copyright notice, post-dating the copyright
30. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 133-34 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5749, 5750.
34. Id..
35. Id.
36. By the 20th century, most other countries had copyright terms based on the life of the
author plus a number of years. Of these, over half had a term of the author's life plus 50 years.
James J. Guinan, Jr., Duration of Copyright, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 473, 477 (1963).
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135-36 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5751.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 21 (1976). If the owner had tried to comply with the notice provision, but
accidentally omitted notice from a few copies, the copyright would not be lost, although the
copyright owner would not be able to recover against innocent infringers. Id. But see Wildman
v. New York Times Co., 42 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (not applying the exception
where the omission stemmed from a mistake in law); Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, Inc., 39
19971
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more than a year in the future,39 and misplacement of the copyright
notice.
40
Responding to these unnecessarily strict requirements, Congress
drastically altered the mechanics of copyright law in the 1976 Act. First,
for works created after January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act granted a copyright
term of the author's life plus fifty years.4 1 Second, the statute retained the
notice requirement, but lessened the consequences for omissions or errors.
For example, failure to affix a copyright notice on a work did not place a
work into the public domain if the author registered the work with the
Copyright Office within five years of publication. 42  The significance of
affixing a notice was that it would prevent an infringer from claiming a
defense of innocent infringement. 43 However, infringers who could prove
that they had relied upon the lack of notice incurred no liability for any
infringement.44 To give maximum protection, Congress finally discarded
the notice requirement as part of the Berne Convention Implementation45 ..
Act of 1988. Affixing the copyright notice became optional, not
mandatory.
46
C. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention, which dates back to 1886, is a multilateral
copyright agreement applying to the more than seventy-five signatory
countries.47  The agreement was developed in response to the problems
European countries faced when creative works crossed national boundaries
F. Supp. 683, 688 (D. Minn. 1941) (not applying the exception where the omission resulted
from "neglect or oversight").
39. See generally Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
40. The 1909 Act specified the location for the copyright notice, such as "upon the title
page or upon the first page of text of each separate number or under the title heading" for
periodicals. J.A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
Failure to follow the notice placement requirements accurately often led to the loss of copyright.
See, e.g., id. (placing copyright notice on back page of a 28-page pamphlet led to loss of
copyright).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1992). The 1976 Act also effectively extended the copyright
duration of works created under the 1909 Act to 75 years for works still under copyright on
January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)-{b) (1994).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994).
43. Id. § 401(d).
44. Id. § 405(b).
45. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994) ("[A] notice of copyright as provided by this section may be
placed on publicly distributed copies.") (emphasis added).
47. SAM RICKETSoN, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 956-58 (1987) (listing 76 countries as of 1986).
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without corresponding copyright protection in foreign countries. An
English work under protection in England, for example, could be shipped
to France, where it received no protection. In fact, such copying of foreign
works was not only condoned, but was also considered "beneficial" and
"honorable." 4 8 The Berne Convention was created to prevent this sort of
international piracy through a reciprocal, universal approach to
copyright.49
The United States signed the Berne Convention in 1986 and then
executed the treaty through the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988.50 However, because Congress declared that the Berne Convention
was "not self-executing," the United States was obligated to follow the
Convention's dictates "only pursuant to appropriate domestic law."
5'
As a result, the remaining vestiges of the 1909 Act conflicted with
sections of the Berne Convention. The Convention grants a copyright term
of the author's lifetime plus fifty years.52 The agreement also applies
retroactively to all works that have not fallen into the public domain
through expiration of the term of protection in the country where
protection is being asserted.53 Thus, if the original work is in the public
domain because it received the full fifty-six years of copyright protection
under the 1909 Act, the Convention will not renew protection. If,
however, the work is in the public domain because the author failed to
comply with notice and registration formalities, the Convention will
protect the work.
54
Until the enactment of section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, the United States was not in full compliance with the
Berne Convention. Congress, in its enabling legislation, stated that "Title
17, United States Code, as amended by this Act, does not provide
copyright protection for any work that is in the public domain in the
United States." 55  Thus, foreign works whose United States copyright
protection lapsed for failure to meet various formalities remained in the
United States public domain, even though the Berne Convention called for
them to be protected.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 19, 23, and 40.
50. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
51. Id. § 2.
52. Berne Convention for Protection of Literary & Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (Paris
Text, 1971), art. 7(1).
53. Id. at art. 18(2).
54. RICKETSON, supra note 47, at 671.
55. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 12, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988).
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D. Section 514 of the Uruguay RoundAgreements Act
Section 514 restores the copyrights on foreign works that have fallen
into the public domain in the United States through failure to meet
formalities or failure to renew, but not through expiration of the original
term of protection. 56 To be eligible for copyright restoration, the work
must not be in the public domain in the source country.57  The source
country must be "a nation, other than the United States, that... adheres to
the Berne Convention ... ,,58
Works that have had their copyrights restored receive protection for
the term that they would have received had they not fallen into the public
domain due to failure to meet formalities. 59 For example, a public-domain
work created in 1920 would not have its copyright restored because it fell
into the public domain through expiration of the original fifty-six year
copyright in 1976. However, a work created in 1940 that fell into the
public domain because of a failure to properly register for the renewal term
would have its copyright restored. That restored term would last until
2015, seventy-five years after its creation, which is the maximum term
established under the 1909 Act as it was subsequently modified by the
1976 Act.
Section 514 does take into account "reliance" parties: people who
rely on the public-domain status of the works. Reliance parties have a
year following the restoration of the copyright during which they may. . . . . 61
continue exploiting the work without incurring liability. After that year,
they are subject to liability conditioned upon receipt of "a notice of intent
to enforce a restored copyright."
' 62
56. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4976, 4980 (1994).
57. The Act defines a source country as:
(A) a nation other than the United States;
(C) in the case of a published work-
(i) the eligible country in which the work is first published; or
(ii) if the restored work is published on the same day in 2 or more eligible countries,
the eligible country which has the most significant contacts with the work.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(8) (1994).
58. Id. § 104A(h)(3).
59. Id. § 104A(a)(I)(B).
60. Id. § 104A(h)(4)(A).
61. Id. §§ 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II); Donald E. deKieffer, GATT Strengthens International
Intellectual Property Protection, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Legalnws Library, Allnws File. See infra note 97.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
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Section 514 also has a special provision for derivative works created
before the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and on
reliance of the public-domain status of works with restored copyrights.
Owners of such derivative works "may continue to exploit that work for
the duration of the restored copyright if the reliance party pays to the
owner of the restored copyright reasonable compensation. . *... If the
parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation, a United States
district court will assess the amount.
64
III. IS SECTION 514 CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Congressional Power to Enact Section 514
Congress did not state the basis for its power in enacting section 514;
however, it did not have to do so for the statute to be constitutionally
valid. 65 Section 514 most likely falls within Congress' power under the
Copyright Clause, which authorizes the legislature "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings andD. • ,,66
Discoveries. Because Congress had the power to grant the copyright, it
63. Id. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B). The determination by the district court:
shall reflect any harm to the actual or potential market for or value of the restored
work from the reliance party's continued exploitation of the work, as well as
compensation for the relative contributions of expression of the author of the
restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work.
Id.
65. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1983) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)) ("constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise."); cf FCC v. Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that Congress need not state its reasons for
enacting a statute).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Alternatively, section 514 might fall within Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce. See 1 MELVILLE B.
N1MMER & DAVID N1MMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.09 (1992). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Until
1995, the Court reviewed challenges to federal statutes as being beyond Congress' commerce
power with a very lenient standard generally called the "rational basis" test. The Court upheld
exercises of the commerce power so long as there was a rational basis for Congress to conclude
that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S.
1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(198 1); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-29 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119-21 (1941). Under this lenient standard, Congress could almost certainly revive copyrights,
because it could conclude rationally that the presence or absence of copyrights for creative
works substantially affects interstate commerce. In particular, failure to adhere to the
19971
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should have the power to revive it. After all, revival of a fallen copyright
may be considered another grant of copyright protection to certain works
in the public domain.
One potential bar to this congressional power is the holding in the
seminal case of Graham v. John Deere Co.67 The Court noted "Congress
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available." 6  At first glance, the dispositive difference
between Graham and section 514 appears to be that the former concerns
patents and the latter copyrights. However, Graham is not so easily
distinguished. The Patent Clause (which is also the Copyright Clause) is
also aArant of power "limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful
arts."' As a result, Congress' power to grant patents is valid only where
it is used to advance "the stated constitutional purpose." 70 The Copyright
Clause similarly limits Congress' power to grant the copyright to the
advancement of the arts.
Where Graham may be distinguished from section 514 is that it
prohibits Congress from removing "knowledge" from the public domain.
A copyright cannot remove knowledge from the public domain, but only
the expression of that knowledge. The so-called "Idea/Expression
Dichotomy," 71 as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102, keeps copyright protection
requirements of the Berne Convention could result in economic sanctions against the United
States.
However, the status of the rational basis test has been cast into doubt by United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1000 feet of a school, exceeded
the scope of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1634. In doing so, the Court made no reference to the
rational basis test. The Court seemed to restrict the commerce power to regulating economic
activity, rather than accept a number of inferential chains connecting the regulated activity to
interstate commerce. Id. at 1630 ("Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not."). Thus, Congress' ability to revive
copyrights under the Commerce Clause is in doubt.
Moreover, Congress' commerce power is still constrained by other constitutional
guarantees, particularly the First Amendment. To the extent that the Court's copyright decisions
may be based implicitly on a balancing of Congress' interest in protecting copyrights against the
public's First Amendment rights in expressing itself, the Commerce Clause may also be subject
to such a balancing.
67. 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 6.
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5670.
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from extending to ideas and facts.72 The expression of ideas or facts can
be copyrighted, but not the ideas and facts themselves. The scope of patent
protection, however, is much broader than that of copyright. Although
ideas cannot be patented, a process or product can be.
73
At this point, a metaphysical distinction between knowledge, ideas,
and facts, and expression is in order. Copyrights protect only expression,
and thus, for copyright purposes, there is no distinction between
knowledge and ideas and facts. 74  For example, one might copyright a
description of a gene-splicing process to create disease-resistant tomatoes,
but another person would be free to use that description and write her own
description of the gene-splicing process.75  Thus, the copyright covers
neither the idea of gene-splicing to create disease-resistant tomatoes, nor
the knowledge of how to go about doing so.
Now consider what happens when one obtains a patent on the gene-
splicing process. The patent does not cover the idea of gene-splicing to
create disease-resistant tomatoes because, as noted earlier, patents do not
extend to ideas. 76 However, the patent does protect a particular process of
gene-splicing, even from independent discovery.77  Thus, the scope of
patent protection is much broader than that of copyright, which allows for
78independent duplication of expression. Furthermore, there may be a
greater number of variations of expression of an idea than there are
processes of accomplishing the same idea. 79  Accordingly, patents arelimited to a much shorter term than are copyrights-seventeen years. 80 It
72. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) ("No
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537,
1541 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he first person to conclude that Dillinger survived does not get dibs on
history. If Dillinger survived, that fact is available to all."); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 66,
§ 2.03[D].
73. For example, compare Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) and Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
74. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 71.
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 556.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
78. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works) .... ").
79. Compare JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902), PAUL THEROUX, THE
MOSQUITO COAST (1986) and Apocalypse Now (1979) (all of which focus on leaving
civilization for an extended journey into a foreign land, culminating in a confrontation with
man's ultimate inhumanity). The point of patenting a process is generally that the process is the
most efficient way of accomplishing a given goal.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994).
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is for this reason that Graham should not be applicable to the revival of
copyrights.
The fact that Congress has the authority to enact a given piece of
legislation does not end the inquiry. A secondary question of whether the
Act can have retroactive effect, and if so, whether it is meant to have such
81effect. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court fashioned a
set of rules for answering this question.
A statute has retroactive effect if "it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed."
82
Congress may enact a statute with retroactive effect if it explicitly provides
for such application. If it does not, however, the Court will not presume
retroactivity unless there is "clear congressional intent favoring such a
result.,
83
On this point, Congress must have intended for section 514 to have
retroactive effect, as the very action of restoring copyrights to public-
domain works implies that the Act must have retroactive effect. This
interpretation is bolstered by the provision of the Act that creates a limited
"safe harbor" for reliance parties; had Congress intended the Act not to
have retroactive effect, these reliance parties would have been exempted
entirely from the reach of the Act.
B. The "Limited Times" Requirement
The Constitution requires that copyrights exist for "limited times."
84
Thus, a second problem to be resolved is whether section 514 violates the
"limited times" provision. Neither the Supreme Court nor lower federal
courts have spoken directly on this issue. What is clear from federal cases
is that the "limited times" provision prohibits "perpetual copyright[s]."
85
The underlying reason for the requirement of limited times is the
balancing of the interests of the creator against those of the general
81. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
82. Id. at 280.
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85. Fashion Originators Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.
1940) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
560-61 (1973) (implying that had Congress, rather than California, passed a statute with
perpetual protection, it would have violated the "limited times" provision); Guinan, supra note
36, at 493 ("It is clear that [perpetual copyright] was not intended as a possibility under the
Constitution.").
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public.86  Thus, the "limited times" provision has been interpreted as
protecting the balance of interests by ensuring that a copyright holder's
monopoly exists no longer than is necessary to provide authors incentives
to create new works.
8 7
Reviving copyrights should not tilt that balance unreasonably toward
the creator because the restored copyrights still result in a shorter
copyright period than if the works had been created after 1978. Creative
works governed by the 1976 Act are copyrighted for the lifetime of the
author plus fifty years. 8 The length of copyright that Congress extends to
the revived works is merely the term that would have been initially granted
had all formalities and requirements been met. It does not exceed the
author's lifetime plus fifty years, and may be considerably less. Thus, if
reviving fallen copyrights tilts the balance too far in favor of creators, it is
because the author's lifetime plus fifty years is too long of a duration for
copyright. But if the author's lifetime plus fifty years is too long, then
section 302 of the 1976 Act is unconstitutional.
8 9
Of course, section 514 provides no additional incentive to the authors
of the public-domain works, because at the time the authors created their
works, they could not have known that Congress would revive their
copyrights. However, this ex post analysis does not doom any statutory
attempt to revive copyrights. The 1976 Act, after all, extended copyright
terms for many pre-1978 works up to nineteen years beyond which they
were entitled to under the 1909 Act.91 Moreover, Congress has previously
acted to mitigate the harshness of the copyright requirements in
exceptional circumstances, even though the legislative acts provided no
future incentives to potential authors. During World War II, for example,
86. Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 372 (1992), affd without opinion, 5 F.3d 1503
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Landes &
Posner, supra note 20, at 361-63; NIMMER & NMMER, supra note 66, § 1.10[C][1], at 1-84
(ascribing the difference between the perpetual property right in real property versus the limited
property right in copyright to First Amendment interests).
87. Economically speaking, "limited times" corresponds to the line at which the marginal
cost to society of increasing copyright duration by another time-unit (such as a day) equals the
marginal benefit to the author of doing so. VARIAN, supra note 21, at 7, 22.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
89. An electronic search on Westlaw in the CTA library on February 6, 1997 yielded no
federal cases ruling on the constitutionality of § 302.
90. Accord Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying
Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REv. 715, 807 (1981).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (extending the renewal term from 28
to 47 years for works in the first term); 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994) (granting a 75-year copyright
term for works in renewal term after 1978). But see NtMMER & N1MMER, supra note 66,
§ 1.10[C][I] at 1-85 to 1-86 (arguing that § 304's extension may be unconstitutional).
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Congress enacted a statute "to preserve the rights of authors ... [who] may
have been temporarily unable to comply with the conditions and
formalities ... because of the [war]." 92 The statute granted such authors
an extension to fulfill the formality requirements if the authors were
United States citizens or citizens of countries that provided reciprocal
copyright protection for American authors.
93
These extensions advanced the underlying goals of the Copyright Act
no further than does section 514. In neither instance does reviving a fallen
copyright provide the author with any additional incentive for creating
works because the creation has already occurred.94  Thus, the lack of
additional incentive for authors should not, by itself, doom section 514.
C. The Takings Clause
The most serious constitutional challenge to section 514 is the
Takings Clause, which prohibits the taking of "private property . . . for
public use, without just compensation."9 5  Using its power of eminent
domain, the government can force a person to give up private property, so
long as the government's purpose in acquiring that property is for public
use and the government compensates the owner96
To consider whether section 514 acts as a taking, it is important to
note that there are two ways to exploit97 a public-domain work. First, the
exploiter simply might make the public-domain work available in a mass
market format, without contributing any creative element to the work.
98
Such exploitation is more or less simple copying of the public-domain
work. For example, an exploiter might typeset J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord
of the Rings and sell copies of the trilogy of novels for profit. Second, the
exploiter might use the public-domain work as a springboard for a
separate, derivative work. For example, an exploiter might produce a
computer game based on Tolkien's trilogy.
92. Act of Sept. 25, 1941, Pub. L. No. 258, 55 Stat. 732.
93. Id.
94. Cf NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 66, § 1.10[C][1], at 1-84 to 1-86.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 205 (1978).
97. Throughout the rest of this Article, the term "exploit" refers to using a public-domain
work in some business enterprise. Although the word "exploit" may carry negative
connotations, its use here does not reflect any moral judgment.
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
99. See id. § 106(2) (1994).
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1. Private Property
As an initial matter, it is important to characterize the property
interest at issue.' 00  Section 514 impacts exploiters in two ways: (1) by
subjecting them to liability for infringement if they sell, display, or
otherwise exploit their stocks of exploited works; and (2) by preventing
them from reaping future profits from continued exploitation of the public-
domain work. For the purposes of takings law, these interests must be
treated differently.
a. Stock Supply of Exploited Works
Under section 514, the government does not physically take the
exploiters' stocks of works.' 0 1 Thus, section 514 will only constitute a
regulatory taking. A regulatory taking occurs when Congress, or a state
body, enacts legislation that diminishes the value of property to a sufficient
degree that the property in effect has been taken, even if it nominally
remains possessed by the owner.102 Although the Court has meandered in
its attempts to set forth a test for determining when a regulatory takin
occurs,10  its 1992 decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
provides a relatively straightforward approach. Under Lucas, "[w]hen...
a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically productive or
beneficial uses of [property] goes beyond what the relevant background
principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it."' 05 Of
course, the relevant background principles for personal property are
different than for real property. In particular, government traditionally has
had more control over regulating the former than the latter and may even
be able to "render ... property economically worthless (at least if the
100. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-
A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1301, 1308 (1989) (noting the
difficulty in predicting what the Court considers property).
101. The significance of a physical taking is that it triggers a much different test. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Court held that any
physical invasion, no matter how minute, constituted aper se taking. Id. at 435-40.
102. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
103. A comprehensive survey of the topic is beyond the scope of this Article; however,
Professor Peterson identifies four separate tests, and notes no satisfactory explanation for why a
given test would be used in a given situation. Peterson, supra note 100, at 1316.
104. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
105. Id. at 1030; see Ann T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REv. 415, 426 (1993) (describing
Lucas as a threshold test).
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property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale)."
106
Here, section 514 renders the acquired stocks of exploited works
economically worthless. Any attempt to sell or display the works exposes
the exploiter to copyright infringement liability. Aside from destroying
the stocks, the only viable alternative left is to lock up the works until the
revived copyright expires. In Lucas, the Court noted that perhaps
governments have more latitude to regulate personal property than real
property. Andrus v. Allard10 7 was the single case cited for this principle.
In Andrus, the Court reviewed the Eagle Protection Act and
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which prohibited the commercial
transportation of parts from birds legally killed before they came under the
Acts' protection. The Court rejected a claim that the Acts effected
takings by denying bird trappers the right to future profits from the sales of
already-slain birds. 109 The Court reasoned that "loss of future profits-
unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender
reed upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is
essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially
competent to perform."
'1 10
In reaching this decision, the Court applied Everard's Breweries v.
Day, II and Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey.112  Both Everard's and Jacob
involved the prohibition of alcohol under the Eighteenth Amendment. In
both cases the Court held that the prohibition against the manufacture and
sale of alcohol did not constitute a taking even though it left people with
acquired stocks of liquor they could not sell. 113 The Court noted that
although the alcohol could not be sold, the owners could still drink their
stocks.
A significant difference between the wildlife protection acts in
Andrus and section 514 is that the former did not deprive the eagle feather
owners of all the uses of the regulated property, only those relating to
commercial transportation. The Court specifically observed that the bird
feather owners were free to display the feathers in their possession.
114
106. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
107. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
108. Id. at 52-54.
109. Id. at 66.
110. Id.
111. 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
112. 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
113. Everard's, 265 U.S. at 563; Jacob Ruppert, 251 U.S. at 303.
114. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66.
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Thus, Andrus does not have to be read broadly to support the proposition
that a government can render personal property completely worthless
without violating the Takings Clause." 1
5
b. Future Profits
Section 514 also prevents exploiters from reaping future profits from
continued exploitation of public-domain works. As noted earlier, the
Court's decision in Andrus v. Allard"16 virtually declares that takings
claims based solely on lost profits are fatal. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 17the Court solidified its position that lost profits are not
a cognizable property interest. Connolly involved an amendment to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 118 that
created liability for employers who withdrew membership from a
multiemployer pension plan. 119 The Court rejected the petitioners' claim
that this imposition of liability constituted an uncompensated taking
because Congress routinely burdens some parties in a way that benefits
others. The Court held that such legislation does not violate the Takings
Clause 12 and added: "[O]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting
rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise
settled expectations . . . .This is true even though the effect of the
legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts."'
121
With regard to lost profits, therefore, exploiters will be unable to
satisfy the Lucas threshold test because they have not suffered a complete
deprivation of all beneficial uses of the property used to create the
exploitations. Specifically, the exploiters can use their materials to exploit
other works; all they have lost is the intangible right to exploit particular
works.122 However, the owners of derivative works have a separate claim
115. Moreover, one commentator has observed that "as the government regulates for
increasingly stronger public interests, the Court appears to lower its threshold of what
constitutes no remaining economically viable use for the purposes of the test." Natasha Zalkin,
Comment, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Takings Doctrine
Through and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REv. 207, 259-60 (1991).
116. 444 U.S. 51 (1979); see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
117. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
118. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 832 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).
119. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 216-17.
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976)).
122. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1049 n.11 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court has indicated that proof that a regulation does not deny
an owner economic use of his property is sufficient to defeat a facial taking challenge.").
19971
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of lost property based on their inability to exploit their copyrighted
derivative works. As mentioned earlier, a copyright is a piece of personal
property, and may be sold or conveyed as such.
123
Conversely, a copyright is intangible and exists only through the
force of congressional law. Under one theory, "when the government
grants A a legal right, it normally retains the power to change the law to
promote the general welfare, and thus no taking occurs when the
government exercises its retained power, even though the change in the
law eliminates A's right under the prior law."'124 Unlike property rights
stemming from the copyright on derivative works that are based on
Congress' retained powers, the effect of section 514 on physical stock is
not based on such powers. Physical stocks of exploited works exist
independent of Congress' copyright laws and are, in fact, subject to those
laws. For that reason, section 514 probably does not effect a taking of the
derivative works' copyrights.
2. Public Use
One justification for a taking is that it is for a public purpose.125
Because section 514 effects a taking of at least the physical copies of
exploitations and the copyrights on derivative works, it must satisfy the
"for public use" requirement. There have been both "narrow" and "broad"
interpretations of this requirement. 126 Under the narrow view, public use
means "actual use or right to use of the condemned property by the
public."'127 Under the broad view, the public needs only to gain a benefit
or advantage for the taking to be deemed a public use.12
The narrow view prohibits Congress from reviving fallen copyrights.
By reviving copyrights, Congress regrants an author a limited monopoly• • • 129
consisting of a bundle of rights. The copyright holder may then exclude
the public from the use of the copyrighted work. Consequently, this
dynamic runs opposite the narrow view's intention of granting public
123. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994).
124. Peterson, supra note 100, at 1313. There is an inherent circularity in this notion,
pointed out by Justice Kennedy: "[P]roperty tends to become what courts say it is." Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).




129. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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access to the taken property. While this view has some supporters, 130 it is
not the majority opinion.
The broad view of public use, on the other hand, encompasses the
reviving of fallen copyrights, even when the taking transfers a property
right from one private party, the copyright exploiter, to another private
party, usually the creator of the work. Professor Thomas Ross describes
such taking as "private-transferee takings."' 132  The fact the government
gives the acquired property to a private party does not, by itself, invalidate
the taking under the public use provision.
a. Doctrinal Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has expressed great deference
toward determinations by legislatures concerning public use. In Berman v.
Parker,133 the Court held that "[s]ubject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."' 134 Thus, the government's taking
constituted public use, although it placed property in the hands of a private
135agency.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff136 the Court fine-tuned the
test so that a use would be public "where the exercise of the eminent
domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."'137 It
upheld Hawaii's taking of land title from lessors and transferring it to
130. In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 556 (Wash. 1982) ("the fact that the public interest
may require it is insufficient if the use is not really public"); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
388 (1798) (stating in dictum the constitutional condemnation of a statutory attempt to take
property from one person and give to another); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 170 (1985).
131. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, appears to have adopted the broad view. See
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954); Berger, supra note 96, at 213-14 (discussing the early case of Mt. Vernon-Woodberry
Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916), in which the Court
approved as public use a taking to grant a power company land and water rights); see also
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (approving a
taking of land for a private company on the grounds that it would generate jobs and revenue for
the local area).
132. Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 355, 359 (1983); Berger, supra note 96, at 226 ("As a general
proposition, however, a private taking is one which benefits one, or a relatively limited number
of persons.").
133. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 33-34.
136. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
137. Id. at 241.
1997]
402 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
lessees because the public would benefit from reducing the concentration
of fee simple ownership in the state. 138 teCuthl hta
Finally, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that an
Environmental Protection Agency regulation requiring pesticide applicants
to disclose data publicly constituted a public use, even where the most
direct beneficiaries would be future applicants.' 39 Ruckelshaus provides
the closest analogy to a taking involving property interests in the
exploitation of public-domain works because both situations involved
intellectual property interests.
140
Admittedly, the mechanics of the benefits in Ruckelshaus and the
benefits in this situation run in opposite directions: The former discloses
information to the public, 14 1 while the latter may ultimately restrict the
flow of information to the public for a limited time. Nevertheless,
Ruckelshaus indicates that the Court is receptive to private-transferee
takings of intangible property, so long as the taking results in some
rational benefit to the public. 142  A Congressional determination that
reviving fallen copyrights provides a public benefit will, in almost all
probability, satisfy the public use requirement in federal court. If
Congress does so, given the Court's deference toward Congress on this
issue, section 514 almost certainly qualifies as being for public use.
In addition, the public will also benefit from adherence to the Berne
Convention. By failing to fully comply with the Convention, the United
States was vulnerable to sanctions and reciprocal adverse treatment from
other member nations whose authors own foreign copyrights to works that
are in the United States public domain. The potential sanctions included
138. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
139. Id. at 1014-16.
140. Cases involving intangible property interests are, of course, much less frequent than
those involving real property. One of the more prominent cases focused on the City of
Oakland's attempt to use the power of eminent domain to keep a professional football team from
leaving the city. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60 (1982). The California
Supreme Court rejected the team's argument "that a professional football franchise is not a
proper subject for eminent domain," on the grounds that the state constitution left no doubt that
a city could take "any property." Id. at 76. The court remanded to the appeals court for a
determination of whether the city could actually demonstrate that the taking would be for a
public use. Id. Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 241-42 (5th Cir. 1967)
(approving as public use a taking of hunting rights).
141. The Court found that there was a clear public benefit in avoiding the need for costly,
duplicative research. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014-15.
142. Id. at 1014 ("So long as the taking has a conceivable character, 'the means by which it
will be attained is ... for Congress to determine."') (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954)).
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bilateral or multilateral trade sanctions, 143 or dispute resolution before the
International Court of Justice.144  Realistically, these sanctions were not
likely to have been used. Countries may have been loathe to apply trade
sanctions simply to vindicate the rights of a few of their own authors.
145
Bringing suit before the International Court of Justice was even more
problematic. As of 1987, no country had invoked that provision of the
Convention.146
Even so, the United States had prudential reasons for complying with
the Convention. For one, this country could improve its self-serving image
with regard to international copyrights. Former Register of Copyrights
Barbara Ringer described the American "role in international copyright
[as] marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, and
narrow economic self-interest." 147 Indeed, the United States' disregard of
the Berne Convention seems particularly incongruous, given the country's
zealous criticism of other countries with more lenient copyright,
trademark, and patent protection.
148
b. Theoretical Considerations
Many theoretical arguments against the broad interpretation of the
Public Use Clause are not applicable to section 514 because these
arguments address real property but not intellectual property, which has
characteristics of a public good. 149  Professor Ross identifies three
significant arguments against private-transferee takings: (1) the potential
for improper motivation of Congress; (2) the lack of continuing
143. RICKETSON, supra note 47, at 828-29.
144. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works, Sept. 8, 1886 (Paris
Text, 1971), art. 33(1).
145. RICKETSON, supra note 47, at 829.
146. Id. at 832.
147. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968).
148. See, e.g., Russell Watson et al., A Little Fight Music, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at
38-39 (discussing 100 percent tariffs being applied against Chinese imports in response to
illegal copying of American goods by China); Brazil Unwilling to Modify Patent Law, Minister
Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 12,1993, available in LEXIS, News library, BNAITD file
(discussing the United States' view that Brazilian patent protection for U.S. inventions is
inadequate).
149. A public good is a good that does not exhibit user exclusivity. That is, how much one
consumer uses the good does not affect how much others can use it. By contrast, a private good
is a good where one person's use of the good negatively affects the ability of others to consume
it. For example, if one person eats an apple, no one else is able to eat that apple. Examples of
public goods are street lights, national defense, and clean air. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMics 5, 108-09 (1988).
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accountability for the use of the property; and (3) the threat to the
institution of private property.1
50
First, private-transferee takings can result from improper motivation
if the government's intent is to help or hinder certain individuals by
transferring property to or from them. 151 This problem stems from the
government's ability to take specific pieces of property. By reviving an
entire class of copyrights, however, Congress cannot pick and choose
certain intended beneficiaries and/or victims.
Congress may intentionally benefit certain copyright holders, while
others merely benefit as a byproduct. While this situation is problematic,
it is still less troublesome than when government targets a specific piece of
property. As Justice Jackson declared in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York:
152
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles
of law which officials would impose on a minority must be
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected.
153
Second, lack of accountability results from the fact that the
government, in transferring taken property to a private party, can no longer
ensure that the property is put to public use, 5 4 Here, the public benefit in
reviving copyrights arises not from any particular use of the work by the
copyright owner, but from conformity with the Berne Convention. Lack of
accountability is not a concern with regard to resurrected copyrights.
Finally, private-transferee takings threaten the institution of private
property, which relies on "a property owner's assurance that he can hold
and use his property without invasion or interference."' 155 Professor Ross
argues that any sense of security is undermined by the very existence of
150. Ross, supra note 132, at 369-70. There is another problem-that of demoralization of
the original owners. Ross argues that demoralization costs are unlikely to be greater for private-
transferee takings than for ordinary takings. Id. at 377.
151. Id. at 370-71.
152. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
153. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Ross, supra note 132, at 369 (noting
that a government's ability to take land is more dangerous than its ability to tax because "it may
be more difficult to generate a constituency sufficient to block an unwarranted taking than to
generate one to defeat an unwarranted tax increase").
154. Ross, supra note 132, at 375.
155. Id. at 378-79.
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eminent domain. Therefore, private-transferee takings do not threaten the
institution of private property to any greater degree than do public
transfers. 156  Note, however, that private-transferee takings provide
another avenue for takings beyond ordinary takings. Thus, while a
property owner might have had no security against the property being
taken for use by the government, the owner could have had security
against property being taken for use by another private party.
Alternatively, Professor Merrill concludes that eminent domain is
appropriately invoked where "barriers to market exchange" make it
infeasible for the government to purchase the property right on the open
market. 157 This formulation stems from the Coase Theorem, which states
that in the absence of transactional costs, parties will bargain to an
efficient result. 158 That is to say, if there are no barriers to bargaining,
159
the right to use or exclude the use of the public-domain work in question
will end up with the party who values it more, whether it be the original
creator or the exploiter.1
6
With copyrights, asymmetric information creates a potentially
formidable barrier to bargaining. The asymmetry arises because the
exploiters can contact the creator much more easily than the creator or the
156. Id.
157. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRN. L. REv. 61, 74 (1986).
Merrill's point draws heavily from an influential article, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972), that divides rules protecting entitlements (i.e., rights) into two
distinctions: property rules and liability rules. A right protected by a property rule must be
purchased from the owner of the right at a price agreed upon by both parties. A right protected
by a liability rule, on the other hand, can be taken by another party for an objectively
determined price, even if the owner of the right would prefer not to sell at that price. Calabresi
& Melamed, supra, at 1092. Eminent domain thus "provides a mechanism that allows
government to convert property rules into liability rules." Merrill, supra, at 74.
158. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 149, at 5. Professor Coase first formulated the theorem
in R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
159. Examples of such barriers include the free rider and hold-out problems. Free riders
are individuals who benefit from a public good without paying for their share of the costs of the
good. They are able to do so, because of the non-rivalrous character of public goods. National
defense, for example, is a public good. Whether or not person A pays for his or her share, the
rest of the country cannot exclude person A from the benefits of the defense. COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 149, at 108-09.
Hold-outs, on the other hand, occur whenever one party must secure a large number of
agreements to achieve a result, such as buying a series of lands to build a highway. Each person
has an incentive to want to be the last to bargain with the purchaser, because at that point, "[t]he
last neighbor to settle... can extract an excessive amount." Id. at 175.
160. Coase, supra note 158, at 6-8.
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government can contact all the exploiters.' As a result, the government
may not be able to purchase the property interest from the exploiters on an
open market without incurring transactional costs. In this situation,
eminent domain may be appropriate because the government may not be
able to engage in voluntary market transactions.
3. Just Compensation
In taking private property for public use, section 514 provides for just
compensation for the exploiters. The exact measure of just compensation
is complicated because there are multiple ways to calculate the value of the
property right to the exploiter. Section 514, however, contains some
provisions pertaining to reliance parties that seem to satisfy the just
compensation requirement.
Two main values could be used to calculate just compensation:
market value and subjective value. Market value is an objective measure,
based on "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller."'
162
Subjective value is the property owner's reservation price, which is the
price at which he would be willing to sell his property. Typically, this price
is higher than the market value.
163
The problem with using market value instead of subjective value is
that market value systematically underestimates the value that the owner
places on the property, and thus potentially moves property from higher
valued uses to lower valued uses. 4 The use of subjective value alleviates
this problem because the government would never acquire property under
eminent domain unless the property value to the public exceeded the
161. This information asymmetry also arises when copyright owners try to police their
copyrights. As a result, copyright holders sometimes grant non-exclusive rights to
clearinghouse organizations that then license the right to use the work to the public. The
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) is one such organization.
ASCAP investigators travel to various locations to monitor public performances of copyrighted
works and to ensure that those performances have been licensed. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty authors face in
detecting infringements of their copyrights: "Because a [creative work] can be 'consumed' by
many different people at the same time and without the creator's knowledge, the 'owner' has no
real way to demand reimbursement for the use of his property except through the copyright laws
and an effective way to enforce those legal rights." Id. at 19 n.32.
For a more detailed analysis of the role of such clearinghouse organizations in policing
copyrights, see Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights
Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CAL. L. REv. 103 (1984).
162. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 149, at 192; EPSTEIN, supra note 130, at 182-83.
163. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 149, at 193; EPSTEIN, supra note 130, at 183.
164. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 149, at 193.
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subjective value of the property to the owner. 6 5 Unfortunately, the use of
subjective value is subject to moral hazard: Property owners have an
incentive to present an inflated subjective value.
166
In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,167 the U.S. Supreme Court
used the market value of the property to determine the value of just
compensation. The Court felt a "need for a relatively objective working
rule, ' 69 something that subjective value does not provide. Under this rule,
the owner is entitled to receive "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to
a willing seller,' ' 170 at the time of the taking. In special circumstances,
however, a court could apply other standards if the use of market value
would be unfair. For example, this approach may be necessary if the
property was one traded so infrequently that its market value could not be
predicted. The Court concluded that "fair market value does not include
the special value of property to the owner arising from its adaptability to
his particular use.';
The measure of just compensation for section 514 is therefore the fair
market value of the property used to exploit the public-domain work.
173
When the property consists of tangible works, such as the actual physical
copies of public-domain works or the actual physical copies of the
derivative works, the fair market value can be measured by the price at
which the goods have been selling. Although section 514 does not provide
such compensation, it does allow parties who have relied on the public-
domain status of works to continue to exploit the underlying work without
liability for one year following the restoration of copyright. 74 This is a
form of "in-kind" compensation, or compensation not in the form of
money.'75 In this instance, "in-kind" compensation makes sense, because
courts will not have to determine the market value of the exploitations
since the market itself will do that.
Of course, in some instances, a year may be insufficient time to sell
an exploiter's stock of infringing works. However, the Court has not
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
168. Id. at 511.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 513.
172. Id. at 511.
173. 441 U.S. at 512-13.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (1994).
175. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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expressed sympathy to this claim. In 564.54 Acres of Land, the Court
applied the fair market value test, even though the fair market value of the
property taken was considerably less than the cost to the owner of
duplicating the conditions of the taken property on a new piece of
property. At other times the Court has held that lost future profits do
not enter into the takings equation; 177 thus, the fair market value might not
include the expected profits.
The one-year limitation seems to be a compromise between the
interests of the exploiters and the practical difficulties in policing the
restored copyrights. For example, section 514 could have allowed
exploiters to sell their acquired stocks without a time limitation. Such an
approach, however, immediately creates the problem of how to establish
when an infringing work was actually produced, before or after the
copyright on the underlying work was restored. Hence, the one-year
duration eliminates this problem.
178
Section 514's lack of explicit compensation for tangible works that
infringe restored copyrights is somewhat troubling. Even more
problematic is when the property involved is the copyright of a derivative
work. The fair market value would appear to be the price at which a
willing buyer would pay for an assignment of the duration of the restored
copyright on the underlying work. Unlike tangible works, however, this
assignment may fall within the class of goods that are traded so
infrequently as to make a determination of fair market value difficult or• • 179
even impossible. For these works, section 514 allows an owner of a
derivative work to continue to exploit that derivative work for the duration
of the restored copyright, so long as the owner of the derivative work pays
reasonable compensation to the owner of the underlying work. 180 In the
event parties are unable to agree on reasonable compensation, a district
court will assess the amount.1 81 Thus, section 514 allows owners of
derivative works to reap a reasonable return on their works, which is all
the Takings Clause requires.
182
176. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 514-17.
177. See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
178. Moreover, there may be a feeling that if physical works cannot be sold off within a
year, they are not popular works anyway, and therefore the economic loss to the exploiter is
minimal.
179. Cf 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 513.
180. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii) (1994).
181. Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B).
182. Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135-37 (1978).
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IV. BALANCING THE EQUITIES
Any equitable action must take into account the effect on the public
domain and balance the public interests in receiving access to the work. If
reviving copyrights unduly restricts public access to the works with the
revived copyrights, Congress would have been better off leaving
everything alone. Unfortunately, Congress did not do so. While drafting
the 1976 Act, Congress discovered that the prices of creative works are
often the same whether in the public domain or under copyright
protection. 183 Thus, economics would not affect public access to the work.
In addition, access to the work can be blocked by other non-economic
factors such as restrictions imposed by the author or an exploiter of the
piece. Ultimately, as Congress found, the only difference is who reaps the
commercial windfall, the original creator or the exploiter.
184
Even if the price will not affect accessibility to a work, it is
theoretically possible for a copyright owner to block the use of the
work. 185  Two recent cases illustrate this possibility. In Salinger v.
Random House, Inc.,186 author J.D. Salinger successfully obtained a
preliminary injunction to block the use of quotations from his unpublished
letters. 187  Although Salinger did not want his unpublished letters to be
used at all, the Second Circuit permitted the defendant, biographer Ian
Hamilton, to report facts contained in the letters. 188 However, the court
granted a preliminary injunction against the use of quotations from the
letters on the rationale that the 1976 Copyright Act grants authors of
unpublished works the right of first publication.18 9 Moreover, Hamilton's
desired use of quotations from the unpublished letters did not constitute
fair use of the works.
190
183. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134 (1976).
184. See id.
185. Of course, foreign authors whose copyrights are revived may also do so. However,
the justification for reviving their copyrights is based on their country's adherence to the Berne
Convention. American authors have no justification; thus, any potential problems require
separate solutions to support the equitable goal.
186. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 100. This result makes sense in light of the "Idea/Expression Dichotomy."
Salinger cannot copyright the ideas contained in his letters, only the expressions thereof. Id. at
95.
189. Id. at 94. The right of first publication is one of many rights accorded to copyright
owners. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
190. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99-100. The Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court's
four-step analysis of the fair use defense as applied to unpublished works enunciated in Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The four factors are: (1)
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In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,l91 the holder of the copyright
on Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," sued rap group 2 Live Crew
for producing a parody. The group tried to obtain a license to the original
song, but Acuff-Rose's agent refused to grant one.192  Campbell differs
from Salinger because the copyright holder was not attempting to remove
the original from the public. Instead, the owner merely sought to protect
the underlying work from ridicule. 9 3 Campbell also differs from Salinger
in that musical compositions are subject to compulsory performance
licenses whereas the letters in Salinger are not; thus, the copyright holder
of non-performance pieces cannot "bottle up" a musical work.
Barring such differences, however, the nature of information allows a
copyrighted work to be used in one manner without preventing another
person from using the work in a different way. Thus, anyone can pay a fee
to license the copyrighted work from the owner. According to the Coase
Theorem,' 9 4 in the absence of impediments to bargaining, the copyright
owner will license his work to the exploiter. This result occurs because the
owner's marginal cost of licensing the copyright is effectively zero as he
or she incurs no significant costs in allowing someone else to use the work,
and the marginal benefit is the licensing fee charged. Consequently, given
the balance where the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, the
copyright owner will likely choose to license the work.
While economics support licensing, other considerations may affect
decisions to license works. Economists have noted that the largest
potential roadblock to bargaining for licenses is not the transactional costs,
but the strategic decisions behind bargaining.19 5  In particular,
"[n]oncooperative outcomes occur because each player's strategy is best
against opponents on average, but not best against every individual
purpose of the use; (2) nature of the copyright; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used;
and (4) effect on the market. Id. at 560-61. The Supreme Court considered the last factor "the
single most important element of fair use." Id. at 566.
191. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
192. Id. at 572.
193. Roy Orbison's original song, "Oh, Pretty Woman" discusses the singer's attempt to
romance a pretty woman. He is rebuffed initially, but later the woman changes her mind and
goes with the singer. The 2 Live Crew version of "Pretty Woman" begins similarly, but then
degenerates into a discussion of a "big hairy woman," a "bald headed woman," and a "two
timin' woman." Id. at 594-96 ("comparing" the lyrics of both songs).
2 Live Crew enclosed a copy of the lyric sheet for its song in its request for permission to
license "Oh, Pretty Woman." Acuff-Rose's agent wrote back, "I am aware of the success
enjoyed by 'The 2 Live Crews,' [sic] but I must inform you that we cannot permit the use of a
parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman."' Id. at 572-73.
194. See supra note 158.
195. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 23 (1982).
REVIVING FALLEN COPYRIGHTS
opponent."' 196  Thus, the possibility exists that an owner of several
underlying works may refuse to accept a bargain for one work merely to
raise the bargaining power in subsequent negotiations.
97
Section 514 solves this problem by allowing the owner of a
derivative work to continue to exploit that work, subject to reasonable
compensation to the owner of the underlying work. If the parties cannot
agree on a reasonable price, a United States district court will set one. In
essence, section 514 extinguishes the copyright owner's present right to
prohibit continued sale of derivative works, and breaks bargaining
impasses due to strategy tactics.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 is a
temporary measure. It has no explicit sunset provision, but will become
obsolete once the Copyright Act of 1909 is no longer applicable.
Nevertheless, because that day is fifty-five years away, section 514
takes care of a pressing need: U.S. compliance with the Berne
Convention.
Section 514 renders the existing stock of exploited works
economically worthless, and thereby constitutes a constitutional taking.
What saves section 514 from unconstitutionality, however, is that the
Berne Convention satisfactorily provides for just compensation to the
parties. And while section 514 currently only applies to foreign and not
domestic works, arguably it should be extended to revive the copyrights of
American works that have fallen into the public domain for failure to
comply with notice and registration formalities. The analysis conducted
herein suggests Congress could grant the revival as long as it formulates its
action as a "public purpose."
196. Id. at 28.
197. Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal
of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179, 206-07 (1992).
198. The calculation stems as follows: The 1976 Act effectively extended copyrights
under the 1909 Act to 75 years, 28 years for the first term, plus 28 years for the renewal term,
and a 19 year extension of the renewal term. The 1976 Act went into effect in 1978; thus, the
latest a work could be created and still fall under the 1909 Act was 1977. Seventy-five years
after 1977 is the year 2052.
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